The Kumtor gold mine and the rise of resource nationalism in Kyrgyzstan by Fumagalli, Matteo
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Kumtor Gold Mine  
and the Rise of Resource  
Nationalism in Kyrgyzstan 
 
Matteo Fumagalli 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Key points 
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Kyrgyz authorities, the opposition, the local communities and 
the mining companies, defend their interests.  
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Kyrgyzstan’s mining sector has become the battleground on which a number of players, 
namely the government, the opposition, local communities, and transnational corporations, 
defend their interests. No other site illustrates this point more than the country’s most prized 
asset, namely the gold mine at Kumtor, located some 350 kilometers south-east of the capital 
city of Bishkek. Kumtor is the country’s main source of hard currency, a vital contributor to 
the country’s GDP, and the single largest private employer. Since 1997, when production 
started, Kumtor has emerged as one of the most contentious issues in the small Central 
Asian republic’s socio-economic and political life.1  
 
After several years of wrangling, protests, and calls for nationalization, the government and 
Centerra Gold (the company that owns the mine) earlier in 2015 looked set for the signing of 
yet another agreement regulating the ownership structure and the sharing of responsibilities 
and profits.2 Instead, in a surprising twist of events, (now former) Prime Minister Joomart 
Otorbayev’s government withdrew from the negotiations with Centerra just before a new 
deal could be finalized on the grounds that the new deal would “no longer [be] in the 
country’s best interests”. 3  This occurred a few days after the Jogorku Kenesh (the 
Parliament) had issued a negative assessment of the government’s handling of the matter 
(signing a new deal, that is). On April 23, the PM resigned. Since the opposition has held 
every single government hostage since 2010 over the Kumtor dispute, this could be 
construed as an outright victory of those outside (and even within) the ruling coalition 
advocating resource nationalism. And yet, the new government, led by Temir Sariyev, 
promptly confirmed that neither nationalization nor the renegotiation of the deal were on 
the agenda. “Nationalization will only create certain risks and threats for us. We must seek 
other ways”, Sariyev stated in April,4 perhaps suggesting that the authorities’ awareness of 
the need for a compromise might actually trump calls for nationalization. Is the turf war 
over?  
 
Simply put, the controversy revolves primarily, albeit not exclusively, around the ownership 
of the mine and the profits that derive from the sale of gold. At the same time the dispute is 
not just about economics but also about the symbolic value of the country’s natural resources 
at a time of imperiled sovereignty. At heart, Kumtor illustrates the dilemmas of small 
countries with weak economies, rich in natural resources, but in need of capital and 
technology, that seek to promote foreign investment while at the same time striving to 
protect their strategic assets. 
 
Resource nationalism 
 
Resource nationalism remains a much-debated, yet poorly understood and considerably un-
der-theorized phenomenon. The context for its more recent upsurge and manifestations is 
evident. As Humphreys notes, this is “closely related to the commodities boom of the 2000s 
and the growing sense amongst the citizens of mineral-rich countries that they have not re-
ceived an appropriate share of the benefits of higher prices and that they have insufficient 
control over the decisions shaping mining investment”.5 A more analytical approach to the 
phenomenon, or trend, has remained much more elusive. While some have paid greater at-
tention to the institutional configurations constraining the environment in which foreign 
companies operate,6 others have privileged more expansive definitions. Bremmer and John-
ston refer to the phenomenon in terms of “efforts by resource-rich nations to shift political 
and economic control of energy and mineral sectors from private and foreign investors to 
domestic and state-owned ones”.7  
 
While the easiest way to define the phenomenon operationally would be to limit oneself to 
actual policies and policy changes, the risk here would be that such a restrictive approach 
might be applicable to too few cases. Moreover, perceptions of instability, a country’s inabil-
ity to respect the sanctity of contracts, and lack of protection for foreign investors have clear 
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negative externalities, such as their impact on investors’ confidence, thereby affecting the 
country’s appeal as a business destination. By contrast, a loose understanding of ‘effort’ 
might stretch the concept so thin to question its heuristic purpose, one of the classical prob-
lems of conceptual travel and over-stretched in the social sciences.  
 
Thus, for the purpose of this paper, the presence or absence of legislative initiatives to rede-
sign the ownership structure of a company or a sector shall be understood as the discriminat-
ing factor between situations which in turn might be understood as illustrative of resource 
nationalism. As such, Ward’s definition of resource nationalism as referring to “government 
efforts to maximize revenues from and exercise control over the exploitation of natural re-
sources” seems quite fitting to capture the issues at stake and the accompanying dynamics.8 
Kyrgyzstan’s mining sector, and specifically the case of the Kumtor gold mine, thus serves as 
a fitting vantage point to explore the rise of this phenomenon, the motives driving it, the tim-
ing, and its impact.  
 
Kumtor’s Centrality to the Kyrgyz Economy 
 
Less endowed with natural resources (especially hydrocarbons) than its neighbors and with 
the hydroelectric sector awaiting investment to deliver on its much-heralded potential, the 
mining sector’s contribution to Kyrgyzstan’s economy is far from negligible. In 2014 it 
accounted for 15% of the budget revenues, 15% of the country’s GDP and over half of its 
industrial output and export revenues, constituting Kyrgyzstan’s main source of wealth (see 
table 1). The country’s mining industry consists of three important sectors, namely gold, 
extractive minerals, and ores;9 of these gold makes the most significant contribution in 
economic terms.  
 
Map 1. Kumtor 
 
 
 
 
Kumtor (map 1) is the largest gold mine in Central Asia operated by a Western company. The 
gold deposit was discovered in 1978, but due to the difficult environmental conditions and 
the costs associated with developing the mine the project was suspended. Development 
started again in 1992 and in 1997 the mine became operational. Production is expected to 
last until 2026, when most of the reserves are expected to be exhausted.  
 
While not overtly complicated, the ownership and operating structure of the mine requires a 
quick summary since this is the issue around which the controversy between the authorities 
and the company revolve: 
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- the Canadian company Centerra Gold Inc. is the owner of the mine; 
- Kumtor Gold Company, fully owned by Centerra, operates the mine; 
- The Kyrgyzstani government owns 33% of the shares in Centerra (not Kumtor) via 
the state-owned mining company Kyrgyzaltyn JSC; 
- Centerra also owns other mining sites in Mongolia, Russia, Turkey, and China; 
- The Kyrgyz government receives dividends from Centerra’s profits. 
 
To complicate matters, the key players involved in the ‘Kumtor saga’ are not restricted to 
government and the company itself, but include the mine’s employees (currently just over 
3,000, 95% locals10), the local communities in the Issyk-Kul Region whose livelihood are 
affected by the economic activities of the mine and the environmental fallout, and, perhaps 
most problematically, all those political actors within the government (such as in the Ata 
Meken and Ar-Namys parties) and outside it (especially the Ata-Jurt opposition party) who 
have campaigned for either a renegotiation of the deal on more favorable terms (for the 
state) or outright nationalization.  
 
Factsheet 1: The Kumtor Gold Mine 
Mine discovered in 1978; Exploration started in 1992, operational since 1997.  
Life of mine: 2026. 
Between May 1997 and until 31 March 2015 the mine has produced ca. 10.3m ounces of 
gold (311 tons). 
Kumtor accounted for 7.4% of Kyrgyzstan’s GDP and 23.1% of its industrial output in 2014 
Expected production in 2015: 470,000-520,000 ounces. 
Source: www.kumtor.kg/en/deposit/production-basic-data. 
 
Contribution to the local economy 
It is difficult to downplay Kumtor’s significance to the country’s economy (see factsheet 1). 
Between May 1997 and until March 31, 2015, the mine has produced ca. 10.3m ounces of 
gold (311 tons). After a very negative year in 2012, output returned to acceptable levels in 
2013 and 2014 (table 1). Kumtor accounted for 7.4% of Kyrgyzstan’s GDP (chart 1), 15.5% of 
industrial output in 2014 (chart 2), and 36.5% of its hard-currency revenues in 2013 (chart 
3). In 2014 its contributions to the national budget were in excess of $120m and in the 
period from 1994-2014 its contributions within the country exceeded $2.7bn.11 In 2015 the 
mine is expected to produce between 470,000 and 520,000 ounces of gold which represents 
a slight decline in production compared to 2014 (production in the 1st quarter of 2015 was 
164,272 ounces).12 
Chart 1. Kumtor’s share of the KG GDP (2014) 
 
Source: Kumtor Basic Operating Results 2014, p. 1. 
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Chart 2. Kumtor’s share of the country’s industrial output (2014) 
 
Source: Kumtor Basic Operating Results 2014, p. 1. 
 
Chart 3. Kumtor’s share in exports (2013) 
 
Source: Kumtor Basic Operating Results, 2013, p.1. 
 
Table 1. Production at Kumtor 
 Production (ounces) Increase year-on-year 
2015 (1st quarter) 164,272  Est. 470,000-520,000 
2014 567,693  -5% 
2013 600,402  +90% 
2012 315,238 -46% 
Sources: Kumtor Operating Results, 1st Quarter 2015; 2014; 2013; 2012. 
 
 
Evolving Ownership Structure 
The agreement regulating the ownership and operation of the mine has changed several 
times over the years. Kumtor Gold is currently owned by the Canadian firm Centerra Gold, 
which owns both the mine and output. According to the original agreement, signed in 1992 
(see table 2), the Kyrgyzstani government had a 67% interest via Kyrgyzaltyn JSC, whereas a 
Canadian company called Cameco Corporation held 33%. The agreement was first amended 
in 2004, whereby Cameco sold some of its gold shares to a new (Canadian) company called 
Centerra (which obtained 66% of the shares) while retaining some shares in Kumtor, 
whereas the government’s decreased to 16%. A new deal was renegotiated under the Bakiev 
administration in 2009 (‘the New Agreement’). As a result of this, Cameco sold all of its 
remaining interests to the government (again, via Kyrgyzaltyn JSC).  
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Table 2: The Kumtor deals and the changing ownership structure 
Partner 1992 (Gen-
eral Agree-
ment) 
2004 2009 New 
Terms 
Agreement 
2013-2014 
Aborted deal 
Centerra Gold 
Inc. 
- 66% of shares 66% 50% 
Kyrgyzstan 
Government 
(via Kyr-
gyzaltyn JSC) 
67% 16% of shares 33% of shares 
in the opera-
tion of Kumtor 
50% 
Kyrgyz gov’t to 
sell its shares 
in Centerra; 
swaps shares 
for a joint ven-
ture in Kumtor 
Cameco Cor-
poration 
33% of inter-
ests 
Sells most of 
gold-related 
shares to Cen-
terra. Retains 
some shares 
  
 
The exact terms of a new deal, replacing the 2009 New Terms Agreement, have been at the 
epicenter of the dispute opposing the government, parliament, and the company over the 
past few years. The details of this (failed) deal are outlined below. Before doing so however, it 
is helpful to recall the historical context behind the recent (post-2010) surge in resource na-
tionalism. This will serve the purpose of understanding why negotiations have been so pro-
tracted and a settlement as procrastinated as it is. This backdrop encompasses real and legit-
imate social grievances at the local community level, the series of incidents and scandals that 
have marred the life of the mine, and the deep political instability which hinders both politi-
cal and economic development. 
 
A Troubled History: Grievances, Scandals, and Unrest 
 
Although the core of the dispute revolves around the ownership, structure, and the 
distribution of profits, social grievances, environmental hazards, and weak governance have 
to be taken into account as well. Local communities show increasing hostility towards the 
mining sector and do not hesitate to resort to violence to disrupt its operations. Just to give a 
sense of the trends, miners went on strike in October 2010 demanding a 100% pay raise; a 
renewed ten-day strike took place in February 2012, where miners demanded that Centerra 
pay part of their social security contributions; more recently, on May 28-31, 2013, clashes 
broke out again. Protesters seized control of an electricity sub-station and cut off the power 
supply to the mine. Environmental risks include pollution of soil, water, and air, as well as 
the presence of hazardous chemicals and waste, and the increased risk of landslides, 
mudflows, and slope erosion. Concerns over the area’s exploitation and environmental 
damage led to new protests in late 2011, which blocked mine-bound supplies. Difficult 
weather conditions in the winter of 2011-2012 led to heavy ice flows and waste build-up, 
slowing production.  
 
Last, but definitely not least, is the issue of governance and political instability. Corruption is 
endemic.13 Authoritarian governments have alternated with brief moments of pluralism and 
competitive politics, but time and again the country has been plunged into regime 
overthrows, such as in 2005 and 2010, giving rise to prolonged phases of instability. Protests 
and calls for nationalization, combined with calls for resource sovereignty, have resurfaced, 
and in fact intensified, in the wake of the 2010 events in Osh, the main city in the country’s 
south, where clashes between groups of ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks left several hundreds dead 
CENTRAL ASIA ECONOMIC PAPERS                                                                                              No. 16, August 2015 
 
7 
 
and hundreds of thousands displaced. The Osh events, and the power vacuum which both 
preceded and followed them, also served as the window of opportunity for the violence, 
rendered the perceptions of fragility of the state (and of national identity too) which have 
marked Kyrgyzstan’s post-independence life even more acute.14 It is against this background 
that the rising calls for the defense of natural resources, and ‘Kyrgyz land’ should be located.  
 
The Rise of Resource Nationalism 
 
Simply put, the controversy revolves primarily around the ownership of the mine and the 
profits that derive from it. Specifically the contentious issues range from the identity of the 
company that owns the mine, the split of the shares between the foreign mining company 
and the state-owned Kyrgyz one, the profits (whether they are from Kumtor ‘only’ or from all 
of the mine’s owner’s revenues), as well as the various taxes and social contributions that the 
company that owns the mine has to pay to the regional development fund, and the taxes that 
are contributed to the state’s coffers.  
 
The main stakeholders seem to hold interests that are not always reconcilable: the local 
communities demand more tangible benefits, such as schools and hospitals, and want more 
done to prevent environmental damage. National authorities have to protect national inter-
ests while attracting foreign investment. Mining companies are subjected to a fluid and cum-
bersome regulatory regime, various types of taxations, and penalties. There is an evident 
economic component to the dispute as the terms of the various agreements outlined in table 
1 clearly show. At the same time Kumtor speaks to a more symbolic dimension of Kyr-
gyz(stani) politics, as the controversy raises questions of sovereignty over a country’s natural 
resources and the possibility (and fairness) of redressing perceived past wrongs.  
 
While controversies have been part of Kumtor’s life, it was only after the collapse of the Baki-
ev regime in 2010 that Kyrgyzstani policy-makers became more vocal and began calling for 
yet a new agreement on better terms for the state or the outright nationalization of the mine. 
In June 2012 Kyrgyzstan’s parliament narrowly voted against the nationalization of the 
mine. When former Prime Minister Joldoro Satybaldiev expressed his opposition to the na-
tionalization of the mine in early October of that year, some 1,000 protesters joined a rally 
organized by the fiercely nationalist party Ata-Jurt in the capital city of Bishkek. Kamchybek 
Tashiev and two fellow Ata-Jurt members, Sadyr Japarov, and Talant Mamytov, were arrest-
ed and charged with seeking to forcefully overthrow the government. The controversy over 
the ownership and the future of Kumtor was re-ignited by the parliament’s decision in Feb-
ruary 2013 to renegotiate the terms of the 2009 agreement. This involved the parliament 
instructing the government to invalidate the 2009 Kumtor Project Agreement and the 2009 
legislation amending the country’s tax code, which gave a more favorable deal to Centerra 
Gold.  
 
In September 2013, the government and Centerra agreed on a Memorandum of Understand-
ing (MoU) according to which the parties would have swapped the government’s shares in 
Centerra for a joint venture in Kumtor. The MoU was initially rejected by the Jogorku 
Kenesh over the clause that would have allowed the distribution of payments due to Kyrgyz-
stan, to Centerra. In December of that year, a version of the MoU without such a clause was 
approved. Rather than bringing negotiations to a close this was merely the beginning of two 
long years of dragging negotiations. In that period what was being negotiated were the exact 
terms of the aforementioned joint venture, whilst politicians from all sides kept invoking the 
idea of nationalization of the mine. Especially vocal were the party Ata-Meken, most notably 
its leader Omurbek Tekebayev, Ar-Namys’s Feliks Kulov, Respublika, and Ata-Jurt (now 
divided in a various splinter groups).15 
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The Deal That Never Was: The Failed Negotiations (2014-2015) 
 
In February 2014, after months of protests, rallies, and violence, the parliament voted in 
favor of a new agreement framework. It seemed that the parties were finalizing the terms of a 
new agreement whose signature was expected first in late 2014 and then any time in the first 
half of 2015. The terms of the agreement would have been the following: 
 
- The government would have released its shares in Centerra; 
- In turns, Kumtor would have been co-owned as a joint venture (50-50) by Centerra 
and the Kyrgyzstani government, via Kyrgyzaltyn. 
 
Changes would have been momentous. To start, Kyrgyzstan currently benefits from 
Centerra’s profits in its other mines elsewhere. The new agreement would have led to 
Bishkek single-handedly giving up those revenues. In turn, it would have taken on greater 
responsibilities (the joint venture) and risks exclusively in Kumtor. This would have tied the 
performance of the Kyrgyzstani economy to the volatility of gold prices, made the local 
economy even more dependent on one single sector (gold) at the expense of other (non-gold) 
sectors, and also raised key questions about the long term development of the country. It is 
worth remembering that production is expected to end in 2026 (after which the agreement 
would have allowed the government to increase its shares up to 67%). In that form the 
agreement stopped undoubtedly short of nationalization. However, as Gullette puts it, it 
evidently gave up long-term financial development for short-term economic gains, 16 
gambling on an uncertain future. 
 
On April 9, 2015, the national parliament adopted a non-binding resolution which called the 
government’s handling of the Kumtor negotiations ‘unsatisfactory’.17 The following day a 
small rally gathered outside the Jogorku Kenesh, calling for a new agreement, but stopping 
short of advocating the nationalization of the mine. On April 13, then Prime Minister 
Otorbayev, in a surprising turn of events, announced that the government would no longer 
pursue a new agreement as this “was no longer in the interests of the country”.18 Ten days 
later, he resigned. While the failure to settle the issue with Centerra no doubt lies at the heart 
of the collapse of the government, victory was short-lived for those advocating 
nationalization, such as Ata-Meken’s Omurbek Tekebayev or Ar-Namys’s Feliks Kulov. 
Within days the parliament had voted in the new coalition government, identical in its 
composition (so, with Ata-Meken and Ar-Namys as the Social-Democratic Party of 
Kyrgyzstan’s junior parties). The new Prime Minister, Temir Sariyev, did not waste time in 
announcing that “nationalization” carries “risks and threats”, and thus “the government 
should look for other ways”. In an even more stunning twist, the prime minister’s 
spokesperson, Bakyt Asanov, noted that the parliament had agreed to ensure the smooth 
operations of the mine. Kyrgyzstan’s record bodes ill in that regard. 
 
The impression instead is that rather than a breakthrough, the stall in the negotiations might 
simply be a lull19 as negotiations are expected to resume during the year. Spats between the 
parties have also resurfaced in late July when the State Agency for Geology and Mineral 
Resources noted that Centerra’s report detailing data on stocks of gold at Kumtor (including 
the projected lower production in 2015) was overdue.20 
 
What caused the government’s turnaround? Has resource nationalism won? Was it a 
turnaround after all? At first glance, the more radical elements inside and outside the 
parliament have held governments hostages repeatedly. Governments have formed and 
collapsed over the fate of Kumtor. Otorbayev’s resignation seemed to be just the latest score 
in a long line of political battles. From a different angle, the refusal to sign a short-sighted 
deal and the fact that the new prime minister excluded (for the time being) the possibility to 
renew the negotiations, could instead show that the moderation of the ruling Social-
Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan and the persona of President Atambayev have prevailed and 
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scope for compromise has finally emerged. Data coming from both inside and outside the 
country suggest an explanation more in line with the logic of the failed agreement. As of mid-
2015 gold prices are low (chart 4) and Centerra’s own data on production at Kumtor also 
suggest lower-than-expected production targets this year. A status quo, which allows the 
Kyrgyzstani government to benefit from other Centerra-owned mines, looks, all of a sudden, 
not to be such a bad deal after all. Short-term economic gains are preserved.  
 
Chart 4. Rise and drop in gold prices 
 
 
Source: Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/bc715480-31f3-11e5-8873-
775ba7c2ea3d.html?siteedition=intl#axzz3h02bs5oX). 
 
While prevalent assessments of the trends in resource nationalism seem to point to the 
cyclical nature of the phenomenon (following fluctuations in global commodity prices), the 
case of Kyrgyzstan calls for additional research into this topic. Regardless of whether the 
spring 2015 events represent a victory for resource nationalists, a success for the more 
moderate voices, or just a lull prior to the parliamentary elections, one thing is clear: among 
the most significant negative externalities of the dragged negotiations are the decline of the 
investors’ confidence in the country’s appeal as an investment destination. Stability and the 
status quo suddenly look preferable, and more lucrative. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Kumtor gold mine is a prized asset in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan. The mining sector is 
central to Kyrgyzstan’s economy and its ability to stay afloat, despite its structural 
vulnerability, its exposure to external shocks, and dependence on the gold sector. The 
negative externalities of the instability in that sector have impacted on all parties concerned, 
with no visible benefit for any. Resource nationalism has become a negative-sum game. 
 
This paper has explored the controversies surrounding the Kumtor mine to discuss and shed 
light on the rise of resource nationalism in the country. Its main contention was three-fold: 
firstly, the mining sector has become the battleground on which the three main stakeholders, 
namely the authorities (including government and opposition), the local communities, and 
the mining companies defend their interests. Secondly, while the specifics of the agreement 
are of course about economics (with a focus on short-term gains), what makes Kumtor 
especially controversial is that this is, at its core, about the vision of the state and the role of 
strategic resources in the present and future of the country. Lastly, as far as Kyrgyzstan’s 
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gold sector is concerned, the rise of resource nationalism seems not to have followed the 
trends in global commodity prices. Though the phenomenon was intensified at a time of 
historically high prices for gold (2011-12), calls for outright nationalization, legislative 
initiatives to that end, and the negotiation of a new deal (however temporarily stalled), have 
continued even as the gold price plummeted (as of mid-2015), thereby questioning 
assumptions that resource nationalism might be a cyclical phenomenon in this respect. It 
might in fact be that the Kyrgyz authorities’ predilection over short-term gains might be 
behind the current lull in resource nationalist tendencies, as the status quo currently benefits 
all parties. Bringing the Kumtor saga to an end would allow the authorities to begin paying 
attention to the country’s other equally urgent economic predicaments. 
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